台湾的未来The Future of Taiwan

Translated from the Chinese original, first published on WeChat「世像」on January 16, 2016.本文 2016.01.16 首发于微信公众号「世像」。

晚上18:49我收到这条新闻

2016年台湾地区领导人选举投票结束,民进党候选人蔡英文、陈建仁以领先超过300万票的绝对优势提前宣布获胜。

(图:原文此处有配图)

朱立伦在败选感言中恭贺蔡英文胜选,他表示,希望蔡英文主席跟民进党能胜选后,带领台湾走向更幸福更美好的未来。

在自习室,田总看到我第一句话就和我说:蔡英文赢了。

好多人在关注台湾大选,好多人觉得台湾经济不行了,没有当年亚洲四小龙的风光,已经被大陆甩开了.

但对于大陆我们也不要盲目自信也不能盲目乐观,大陆未来的路也很艰难,多点开话,很有可能顾此失彼。南海是主战场,经济是大问题,现在绿营得票率过于夸张了,蔡英文大可以玩"穷则维持现状、达则宣布独立"的把戏,随便选大陆最不能分神的时间发难,比如南海跟美军冲突了,或是经济不稳的时候,主动权在蔡一边,因为大陆总不能人家还在学国民党"维持现状"的时候,就喊"我要制裁你"吧,当然之前的当孙子让利肯定是没了。

但是陷入全面危机的台湾肯定不会突然就亲大陆了,而是恰恰相反,危机中的民意才是最疯狂的,关键是自始至终这场双输的战争都是在自己家门口打的,美日大可以隔岸观火笑哈哈,大陆武统那最好不过,吞下一个火药桶

现在回想习马会,好像有一丝深意.如果习总觉得蔡英文是个可以沟通的对象,那为什么要赶在马英九即将卸任的时候举行习马会?马英九现在可是政治毒药。

我们先来看一张图,看看台湾方面对于两岸关系是怎么看待的

(图:原文此处有配图,"关于两岸台湾人在想些啥"信息图,含两岸交流意愿、两岸经贸交流态度、维持现状比例、蓝绿执政下台湾人的认同转变等数据)

细细分析下来,在台湾的政客是肯定不愿统一的,蓝绿的大基调基本一致,只是绿营更激进,蓝营希望获取更大利益。

台湾的民众对独统没有一个普遍的共识,但是大部分不愿统一,原因在于目前这种状况最符合大家利益,之所以民众不愿统一但也不想独立的原因就在于独立是要受到大陆武力制裁的,民众是不希望这个结果的。台湾经济发达、政治自由,的确优于大陆。

(图:原文此处有配图,"两岸关系天平"与"两岸敌友量表")

而且从小市民心态而言,台湾民众保持了一个城里人看乡下亲戚的感觉,平时唠唠嗑可以,谈正经的,很少有谁愿意自己也融入这个穷亲戚的家庭。

但是还有少数人愿意统一,比如台湾老兵,原因肯定就是血浓于水之类的,但是数量可以忽略不计,老兵已经渐渐凋零不见,在现如今他们的声音已经没有话语权而且被淹没了。

从事两岸经贸的部分商人到很多愿意统一,两岸始终开放不了的部分政策阻碍了他们的发展壮大,不是出于爱国而是出于商业利益,

在台湾你可以不支持独立,但不能支持统一,在他们看来那就是卖台。

那么台湾的未来是怎样的呢?

总结起来不外乎四种可能:

1、独立

2、维持现状

3、武力统一(各种包括武统成功、武统成功但动荡不断,失败等)

4、和平统一

独立的话,以目前大陆的军事实力,美军不掺和,一周到10天拿下台湾还真不是问题,美军搅合另说.这中间经历的过程是台湾从最开始的仅凭海峡天险和自己就可以防御,慢慢演变成必须依靠美国才能自保,现在的情况是:即使美国适度参与,只要不起倾国之兵和大陆翻脸,也越来越无法军事自保的局面。

想独立,武力肯定是要采取的,但是是两岸都不愿看到的

而且基于和中国的深究考虑,美国是精明的,和大陆的利益远大于台湾,台湾只能用来牵制大陆而不能撕破脸.美国不可能明目仗胆支持台湾独立

独立和武力统一采取的方式大概类似,都是是不希望采取和看到的

维持现状是中庸折中的办法

那么和平统一呢?

现在大多数台湾人对大陆不认同究其原因还是目前中国不管软实力(文化等氛围)还是硬实力(经济)虽然已经超过台湾很多,但还是依旧前路漫漫。

如果大陆人均收入已经达到或者超过台湾,谁还和你谈民主、谈自由、谈意识形态,扯淡到时候水到渠成,谁都不闹,自然一统。不过也是后话了,路真的还很长,前景也不是很明郎,路不是那么容易走。

当中国真正实现崛起的时候,现有支撑台独的理论将难以再获得台湾人的心。到时候,(我自己意淫哈,不喜勿喷)一个很大的可能,是台湾人希望统一,希望加入中华人民共和国。就像是墨西哥,波多黎各等等现在世界都希望加入美国一样。

届时的美国,可能也会反对。但到时候情况肯定和现在不可同日而语也好得多.美国越过遥远太平洋吹过来的风,有多少人会继续听从和追随还真不一定

不过随着最早来到台湾的大陆人的渐渐凋零,台湾人支持统一的比例,随着台湾的不断去大陆化的教育,年轻一代的成长,在未来十年内,将会继续下降

台海不战不和不统不独的现状,必然也会随之改变。

我自己没什么政治主张,就我个人根据我自己的亲身体验,经历和了解,希望维持现状的.同时希望台湾这个美丽美好的的宝岛——明天会更好

At 6:49 this evening, I got the news.

Voting in the 2016 election for the leader of the Taiwan region has closed, and the DPP's candidates, Tsai Ing-wen and Chen Chien-jen, declared victory ahead of the final count with a commanding lead of more than 3 million votes.

(Figure in original.)

In his concession speech, Eric Chu congratulated Tsai on her win, saying he hoped Chairwoman Tsai and the DPP, having won, would lead Taiwan toward a happier and brighter future.

In the study room, the first thing my buddy Tian said the moment he saw me was: Tsai Ing-wen won.

A lot of people are watching the Taiwan election. A lot of people feel Taiwan's economy is flagging, that it's lost the glory of its Asian-Tiger days and been left in the mainland's dust.

But when it comes to the mainland, we shouldn't be blindly confident or blindly optimistic either. The road ahead for the mainland is hard, too, and stretched too thin across too many fronts, it could easily lose on one while gaining on another. The South China Sea is the main battlefield; the economy is a big problem. And the Green camp's vote share right now is frankly staggering. Tsai could easily play the game of "keep the status quo when weak, declare independence when strong" — picking whatever moment the mainland can least afford to be distracted to make her move: say, a clash with U.S. forces in the South China Sea, or a wobble in the economy. The initiative would be on Tsai's side, because the mainland can hardly turn around and shout "I'll sanction you" while she's still doing her KMT impression of "maintaining the status quo." Of course, the days of playing the meek little brother and handing over concessions would be over.

But a Taiwan plunged into all-out crisis certainly won't suddenly warm to the mainland — quite the opposite. Public sentiment in a crisis is at its most volatile. The key is that, from start to finish, this lose-lose war would be fought right on our own doorstep, while the U.S. and Japan get to sit across the water and laugh. And if the mainland reunifies by force, so much the better for them — the mainland would have swallowed a powder keg.

Thinking back now on the Xi-Ma meeting, there seems to be a hint of deeper intent in it. If General Secretary Xi felt Tsai Ing-wen was someone he could communicate with, then why hold the Xi-Ma meeting right as Ma Ying-jeou was about to leave office? Ma is political poison right now.

Let's first look at a chart showing how the Taiwan side views cross-strait relations.

(Figure in original: an infographic titled "What Taiwanese people are thinking about cross-strait relations," with data on willingness to engage across the strait, attitudes toward cross-strait trade and economic exchange, the share favoring the status quo, and shifts in Taiwanese identity under Blue versus Green rule.)

Analyzed carefully, the politicians in Taiwan are definitely unwilling to reunify. The Blue and Green camps' basic tone is largely the same; it's just that the Greens are more radical, while the Blues want to extract greater benefits.

The Taiwanese public has no broad consensus on independence versus reunification, but most don't want to reunify — because the current situation best serves everyone's interests. The reason the public doesn't want reunification but doesn't want independence either is that independence would invite military punishment from the mainland, and that's an outcome they don't want. Taiwan's economy is developed and its politics are free — genuinely better than the mainland's.

(Figure in original: "the cross-strait relations scale" and "the cross-strait friend-or-foe gauge.")

And from the perspective of ordinary townsfolk, the Taiwanese public has kept the attitude of a city dweller looking at a country cousin: happy enough to shoot the breeze day to day, but when it comes to anything serious, few are willing to actually marry into this poor relative's family.

There's still a small minority who favor reunification — Taiwan's old veterans, for instance, out of something like blood being thicker than water. But their numbers are negligible; the veterans have gradually faded away, and by now their voices carry no weight and have been drowned out.

Some of the businesspeople engaged in cross-strait trade are quite willing to reunify — the perpetually stalled policies keep them from growing and expanding. Not out of patriotism, but out of commercial interest.

In Taiwan you can decline to support independence, but you can't support reunification — in their eyes, that's selling out Taiwan.

So what does Taiwan's future look like?

To sum up, it comes down to four possibilities:

  1. Independence

  2. Maintaining the status quo

  3. Reunification by force (all variants included — successful unification, successful unification but with lasting unrest, failure, and so on)

  4. Peaceful reunification

As for independence: given the mainland's current military strength, if U.S. forces stay out, taking Taiwan in a week to 10 days really wouldn't be a problem. If U.S. forces get involved, that's another matter. The arc here is that Taiwan started out able to defend itself with nothing but the natural barrier of the strait, then slowly evolved into needing to rely on the U.S. just to survive; and the situation now is that even with moderate U.S. involvement, so long as the U.S. doesn't commit its full might and go to the mat with the mainland, Taiwan is increasingly unable to defend itself militarily.

If it wants independence, force will surely have to come into play — but that's something neither side wants to see.

And based on a deeper reckoning with China, the U.S. is shrewd: its interests with the mainland far outweigh those with Taiwan. Taiwan can only be used to keep the mainland in check, not to trigger an all-out falling-out. The U.S. is not about to brazenly back Taiwan's independence.

Independence and reunification by force would play out in roughly similar ways — both are outcomes no one wishes to take or to witness.

Maintaining the status quo is the middle path, the compromise.

So what about peaceful reunification?

The root reason most Taiwanese today don't identify with the mainland is that, in both soft power (cultural atmosphere and the like) and hard power (the economy), China — though it has already surpassed Taiwan by a wide margin — still has a long road ahead.

If the mainland's per capita income reaches or surpasses Taiwan's, who's still going to lecture you about democracy, about freedom, about ideology? It'll all be moot. By then it'll come naturally — nobody kicks up a fuss, and unification just happens. But that's a story for later. The road really is long, the outlook isn't all that clear, and it won't be an easy path to walk.

When China truly rises, the theories that currently prop up Taiwanese independence will struggle to win Taiwanese hearts anymore. By then — and this is just my own wishful daydreaming, so don't come at me if you don't like it — one very real possibility is that Taiwanese people will want reunification, will want to join the People's Republic of China. Just as, today, places like Mexico and Puerto Rico all supposedly wish they could join the United States.

The America of that day may well object, too. But the situation then will surely be far better and simply not comparable to now. Just how many people will keep heeding and following the wind that America blows in from across the distant Pacific — that's genuinely hard to say.

Still, as the earliest mainlanders who came to Taiwan gradually pass away, and with Taiwan's ongoing de-Sinicization education and the coming-of-age of the younger generation, the share of Taiwanese who support reunification will keep falling over the next decade.

And the status quo across the strait — no war and no peace, no unification and no independence — is bound to change along with it.

I don't have much in the way of political positions myself. Speaking purely for myself, based on my own firsthand experience and understanding, I hope for the status quo to hold. And I hope this beautiful, wonderful island — this treasure island — has a brighter tomorrow.

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